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EXEcUtiVE 
sUmmarY
I.
EU funds managed by Europeaid and 
Echo  which  were  channelled  through 
Un organisations increased from 500 mil-
lion euro in 2002 to over 1 billion euro in 
2008. the increase can be explained part-
ly by streamlined procedures and partly 
by the commission’s response to major 
crises in afghanistan, iraq, the occupied 
palestinian territory and sudan which was 
largely channelled through the Un. the 
december 2005 European consensus on 
development and the march 2005 paris 
declaration on aid Effectiveness commit 
the EU to coordinate and harmonise aid 
in close cooperation with international 
organisations such as the United nations 
(see paragraphs 1 to 10).
II.
the audit addressed the following two 
questions (see paragraphs 11 to 13):
(a) does the process for deciding to im-
plement aid through the Un demon-
strate that this is the most efficient 
and effective option?
(b) do monitoring arrangements provide 
assurance on the robustness of finan-
cial procedures and on the achieve-
ment of objectives? special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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III.
the  strategic  and  legal  requirements 
to select partners in an objective and 
transparent way are insufficiently trans-
lated  into  practical  criteria  to  support 
decision-making. despite being satisfied 
with its choice of partner, the commis-
sion does not convincingly demonstrate, 
before deciding to work with a Un organ-
isation, that it has assessed whether the 
advantages offset any disadvantages. the 
choice of a Un organisation is not based 
on sufficient evidence that this approach 
is more efficient and effective than other 
ways of delivering aid. neither Europeaid 
nor Echo systematically carries out for-
mal appraisals of alternative aid delivery 
mechanisms in order to compensate for 
the  absence  of  competitive  tendering 
(see paragraphs 14 to 28).
IV.
the commission verifies the robustness 
of financial management systems through 
a prior assessment of the control systems 
of its Un partners (the four pillar analy-
sis). the commission seeks confirmation 
on  the  practical  operation  of  financial 
systems and the achievement of results 
through Un reports, its own field moni-
toring and verification missions. however, 
the commission has not yet succeeded in 
obtaining from Un reports adequate in-
formation on the efficiency of implemen-
tation and the achievement of objectives. 
the commission’s own field monitoring is 
not designed to compensate for the limi-
tations of Un reports (see paragraphs 29 
to 39).
EXEcUtiVE  
sUmmarY
V.
the  Un  panel  of  External  auditors  has 
continually questioned the commission’s 
right to carry out financial checks. it ar-
gues  that  its  own  audit  arrangements 
are sufficient, but does not provide the 
commission with satisfactory evidence 
that financial control procedures work in 
practice. the court of auditors has also 
encountered difficulties accessing infor-
mation from Un organisations when car-
rying out its annual financial audit of the 
commission’s accounts (see paragraphs 
40 to 46).
VI.
on the basis of these observations, the 
court makes recommendations to im-
prove  decision-making  procedures  and 
to focus on the achievement of results 
which could help the commission to pro-
vide more efficient and effective aid (see 
paragraphs 48 to 49).8
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COMMISSION OVERSEAS AID THROUGH THE UN 2002–08
chaptEr 1 
introdUction 
SECTION 1.1 
CONTEXT OF THE AUDIT
  1.    in implementing overseas aid the commission works through vari-
ous partners including national governments, the private sector, 
ngos and international organisations such as the United nations 
(Un). Where aid is implemented through the Un, the commission 
provides funding for activities to be implemented by a Un or-
ganisation. commission decisions to channel aid through Un or-
ganisations from the Europeaid co-operation office (Europeaid) 
and from the directorate-general for humanitarian aid (Echo) 
increased assistance from 500 million euro in 2002 to over 1 bil-
lion euro in 2008 as shown in Figure 1. this increase reflects 
the commission’s strategic commitments (see paragraph 5), the 
response to major crises in afghanistan, iraq, the occupied pal-
estinian territory and sudan (see paragraph 6) and streamlined 
procedures (see paragraphs 8 and 9).
  2.    Europeaid is responsible for the commission’s development aid 
including longer-term rehabilitation. in 2008 it committed a to-
tal of 8 890 million euro of which 670 million euro (8 %) was 
channelled through Un organisations. commission delegations in 
beneficiary countries play a key role in the process for deciding 
the mechanism for implementing aid.
FIGURE 1
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
1 400
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
e
u
r
o
EuropeAid ECHO
Source: European commission.special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
9
special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
  3.    Echo is responsible for the commission’s response to humanitar-
ian crises. it funds activities designed to save and preserve life 
during emergencies and short-term rehabilitation work. it does 
not implement activities directly, but through partners consisting 
of international organisations and non-governmental organisa-
tions (ngos). in 2008 Echo committed a total of 937 million euros 
of which 404 million euros (43 %) was channelled through Un or-
ganisations. the subdelegated authorising officer is responsible 
for the choice of aid implementation mechanism, acting on the 
advice of desk officers in Brussels and field officers located in 
beneficiary countries. 
  4.    the Un is funded partly by mandatory contributions from Un mem-
ber countries based on their gross national income, and partly by 
voluntary contributions to Un organisations. the commission’s 
funding takes the form of voluntary contributions and represents 
in the order of 6 % of Un resources. the commission may contrib-
ute to multi-donor funds as one of several donors supporting the 
action, or it may be the only donor. it does not contribute to the 
general budget of Un organisations with the exception of a Un 
agency in the occupied palestinian territory, to which it contrib-
uted 66 million euro in 2007.
  5.    the december 2005 European consensus on development and 
the march 2005 paris declaration on aid Effectiveness commit 
the EU to coordinate and harmonise aid in close cooperation with 
international organisations such as the United nations. in 2006 
and 2007 the commission made over 700 separate contributions 
to some 30 different Un organisations. the main partners and the 
amounts received are shown in Figure 2. 
  6.    the activities financed were spread over more than 90 countries. 
the four countries which received most contributions were all 
conflict-affected (the occupied palestinian territory, iraq, afghan-
istan and sudan), as shown in Figure 3.
  7.    the European parliament in its discharge decisions has ques-
tioned why the commission channels funds through the Un, and 
encouraged more direct management by the commission. it has 
expressed concern at the lack of transparency and visibility con-
cerning commission funding through the Un and has requested 
assurance on the adequacy of the management of these funds1.
1  European parliament decisions on 
the discharge for implementation 
of the EU general budget for the 
financial years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 
2007.10
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FIGURE 3
FIGURE 2
CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN ORGANISATIONS IN 2006 AND 2007
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN BY RECIPIENT COUNTRY IN 2006 AND 2007 
(MILLION EURO)
Iraq, 222 (10 %)
Palestine, 232 (10 %)
Other, 1 082 (47 %)
Congo, 34 (1 %)
Zimbabwe, 36 (2 %)
Myanmar, 38 (2 %)
Indonesia, 40 (2 %) Somalia, 40 (2 %)
Sri Lanka, 48 (2 %) Tanzania, 32 (1 %)
Ukraine, 61 (3 %)
Afghanistan, 171 (8 %)
Sudan, 147  (6 %)
Bangladesh, 89 (4 %)
Source: European commission.special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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2  council regulation (Ec, Euratom) 
no 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on  
the financial regulation applicable  
to the general budget of the 
European communities (oJ l 248, 
16.9.2002, p. 1).
3  Un organisations may manage 
commission funds in accordance 
with their own accounting, audit, 
internal control and procurement 
procedures, provided these conform 
to internationally accepted standards 
(article 53d(1) of the financial 
regulation and the preamble to the 
fafa). 
4  article 274 of the Ec treaty states 
that the commission shall implement 
the budget on its own responsibility. 
article 27 of the financial regulation 
states that budget appropriations 
shall be used in accordance with 
the principles of sound financial 
management. article 165 of the 
financial regulation states that 
the implementation of actions by 
international organisations is subject 
to scrutiny by the commission.
5  commission regulation 
(Ec, Euratom) no 2342/2002 of 
23 december 2002 laying down 
detailed rules for the implementation 
of council regulation (Ec, Euratom) 
no 1605/2002 on the financial 
regulation applicable to the general 
budget of the European communities 
(oJ l 357, 31.12.2002, p. 1).
SECTION 1.2 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
  8.    article 53 of the financial regulation which came into force in 
2003 and was revised in 2007 sets out the conditions for working 
with international organisations2. this method of implementing 
the budget is called joint management. despite its name, the 
tasks related to the implementation of these funds are not jointly 
managed, but are delegated to international organisations to be 
implemented in accordance with their own procedures3. neverthe-
less, the treaty and the financial regulation insist that the com-
mission retains overall responsibility for sound management of 
the budget4. tasks can be directly delegated to organisations and 
article 43 of the implementing rules on the financial regulation 
requires that the organisations and the actions to be financed 
shall be chosen in an objective and transparent manner5. 
  9.    the 2003 financial and administrative framework agreement 
(fafa) translates into contractual terms the requirements of the 
financial regulation and applies to all funding agreements be-
tween the commission and the Un. it sets out a framework in-
tended to enhance cooperation by allowing Un organisations to 
manage contributions in accordance with their own procedures. 
the procedures for joint management with Un organisations dif-
fer from those required for actions implemented through ngos, 
which generally involve competition and the use of commission 
procedures. article 3.1 of the fafa requires all actions to comply 
with the principles of sound financial management, in particu-
lar value for money and cost-effectiveness. the fafa encourages 
multi-donor actions, requires Un organisations to publicise the 
role of EU funding, outlines the use of subcontractors and defines 
the financial framework and payment policy. it describes pro-
cedures for checking that funds are managed properly including 
the submission of reports by the Un and the right of the commis-
sion to carry out checks. 
  10.    a contribution agreement is signed for each Un action funded by 
the commission, describing the amount of funding, the objectives 
of the action, the activities to be carried out and their timing. the 
contribution agreement incorporates the provisions of the fafa 
regarding the use of the Un organisation’s own procedures, vis-
ibility, use of subcontractors, financial framework and procedures 
for checking and reporting.12
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  11.    the present audit covered overseas aid of Echo and Europeaid 
funded through Un organisations and addressed the following 
two questions:
(a)  does the process for deciding to implement aid through the 
Un demonstrate that this is the most efficient and effective 
option?
(b)  do monitoring arrangements provide assurance on the ro-
bustness of financial procedures and on the achievement of 
objectives?
  12.    the consequence of weak procedures is a risk of a reduction in 
the efficiency and effectiveness of commission spending. the 
second phase of the audit, to be reported on at a later date, will 
assess the extent to which this risk materialises.
  13.    the audit was based on:
(a)  an analysis of documentation, including the commission’s 
may 2008 evaluation of its cooperation with the Un and re-
ports of the commission’s internal audit service (ias) on the 
implementation of the fafa in 2006, 2007 and 2009; 
(b)  interviews with commission and Un staff at their headquar-
ters in Brussels and new York;
(c)  on-the-spot visits to the occupied palestinian territory and 
sudan in order to corroborate the reliability of monitoring 
systems;
(d)  observation of the april 2008 fifth annual fafa working group 
in Vienna and the april 2009 sixth annual fafa working group 
in Brussels;
(e)  previous audits of the court in which Un actions were in-
cluded; and 
(f)  the results of 52 questionnaires, addressed to delegations in 
the case of Europeaid and desk officers in the case of Echo, 
concerning the reasons for working with the Un and the sys-
tems for monitoring implementation6.
6  the sample of 52 contracts with 
a total value of 764 million euro 
represented 7 % of the total number 
of contracts (741) agreed with the Un 
in 2006 and 2007 comprising 33 % of 
their total value (2 286 million euro).
chaptEr 2 
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  SECTION 3.1 
DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT AID THROUGH THE UN
  14.    robust procedures for selecting the most appropriate aid delivery 
mechanism to achieve Ec policy objectives are necessary in order 
to ensure that the choice is based on the organisation’s capacity 
to carry out the task efficiently and effectively. the audit there-
fore examined whether the process for deciding to implement 
commission aid through the Un was objective and transparent 
and whether it demonstrated that this was the most efficient and 
effective option. in particular the audit examined whether deci-
sions to fund Un organisations were informed by:
(a)  strategic policy guidelines requiring an assessment of the Un 
organisation’s suitability to carry out the proposed tasks;
(b)  a comparison with alternative aid delivery mechanisms.
STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS INSUFFICIENTLY 
TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICE
  15.    in addition to the commitments of the European consensus (see 
paragraph 5), the 2001 commission communication on ‘Building 
an effective partnership with the United nations’ set out the com-
mission’s strategy for funding aid through Un organisations7 and 
contained the following two main messages which remain pre-
conditions of working with the Un:
(a)  the decision to fund a Un organisation should be based on 
its capacity to carry out the proposed task efficiently and ef-
fectively; and
(b)  through the provision of systematic rather than piecemeal 
funding, the commission should focus on results, rather than 
inputs, and ensure that Un reporting adequately demonstrates 
the achievement of well-defined objectives. 
7  com(2001) 231 of 2.5.2001 
‘Building an effective partnership 
with the United nations in the 
fields of development and 
humanitarian affairs’. the subsequent 
communication com(2003) 526 of 
10.9.2003 ‘the European Union 
and the United nations: the choice 
of multilateralism’ discussed how 
the EU council, member states 
and commission could make the 
EU more effective in shaping Un 
policy, but did not revise the strategy 
concerning cooperation in the 
development and humanitarian 
fields. these two communications 
are complemented by strategic 
partnership agreements with 
a number of Un organisations.
chaptEr 3 
oBsErVations14
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  16.    the commission’s strategy with regard to EU assistance funded 
through Un organisations covered both development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid. it suggested that cooperation should focus 
on the six thematic areas identified as a priority for all develop-
ment aid in the november 2000 statement by the council and the 
commission on ‘the European community’s development policy’8. 
however, in 2007 over half the commission funding through the 
Un related to dealing with crises (mainly post-crisis humanitar-
ian aid, rehabilitation and recovery), rather than the six thematic 
  areas identified in the communication. some 40 % of commis-
sion aid through the Un was spent on these six areas9, consider-
ably less than the proportion of global commission aid, which 
amounted to almost 80 %10. it is not clear what added value the 
focus on thematic areas brings because it appears not to be fol-
lowed in practice. 
  17.    the strategic requirements are insufficiently translated into prac-
tical criteria for assessing the advantages and disadvantages of 
working with Un organisations. the commission has carried out 
retrospective analysis which shows that there are good reasons 
for implementing aid through the Un (see paragraph 20) and that 
the commission was satisfied with its choices (see paragraph 27). 
however, before deciding to work with a Un organisation, the 
commission does not systematically document its assessment of 
whether the added value of the Un offsets any disadvantages. 
  18.    Before contracting with a Un organisation, Europeaid does not 
systematically carry out a documented assessment of its suitabil-
ity to implement the proposed task. information on past per-
formance, including the findings of results-oriented monitoring, 
is available to delegations through the cris database, and, since 
2008, the twice-yearly external assistance management reports 
(Eamrs) include a specific section on international organisations. 
however, the information is not currently analysed and commu-
nicated to delegations in a way which could more usefully inform 
such assessments. one of the purposes of the commission’s evalu-
ation in 2008 was to establish whether there were clear reasons 
for implementing aid through the Un. Europeaid has also carried 
out surveys to establish why Un organisations have been selected 
as partners.
8  the six priority areas were:  
(i) trade and development;  
(ii) regional integration and 
cooperation; (iii) macroeconomic 
policies and social sector support ; 
(iv) transport; (v) food security and 
sustainable rural development;  
(vi) institutional capacity building.
9  United nations: improving lives — 
results from the partnership of the 
United nations and the European 
commission in 2007.
10  Europeaid cooperation office: 
annual report 2008 on the Ec’s 
development and external assistance 
policies and their implementation 
in 2007. special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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  19.    Because of the urgent character of its interventions, Echo en-
ters into framework agreements with all its partners, having first 
  assessed their suitability. in addition, before entering into an 
agreement for a specific intervention, it systematically carries out 
and documents an appraisal of the capacity of the partner for the 
specific action proposed. however, the useful information on past 
performance of Un partners, contained in Echo’s project moni-
toring system, is stored at the level of operational units rather 
than being made readily available to all desks to inform decisions 
on funding Un organisations. consequently, Echo’s assessment 
process may be based on incomplete information and so the partner   
may not have the capacity to deliver the expected results, particu-
larly where it diversifies outside its core activity. 
  20.    the court’s questionnaires (see paragraph 13) aimed to identify, 
for each of the 52 contribution agreements, the three main rea-
sons for choosing to work with the Un. the relative importance of 
the reasons for selecting the Un are summarised in Figure 4. the 
results of the questionnaires confirmed the findings of the com-
mission’s evaluation and surveys that the commission chooses to 
work with the Un primarily for attributes linked to its capacity to 
deliver, such as its experience, expertise, logistical capacity (in-
cluding access to insecure zones) and past performance.   another 
reason why the commission chooses the Un is its capacity for 
coordination and high-level dialogue. 
FIGURE 4
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF REASONS FOR CHOOSING UN
Logistics
14 %
Experience and 
expertise
24 %
Visibility
2 %
Low cost
2 %
Guidelines
3 %
Speed
5 %
Simple procedures
6 %
Special mandate
6 %
Past performance
12 %
Relevance of proposal 
7 %
Coordination/ dialogue
19 %
Source: replies by European commission to Eca questionnaires.16
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  21.    the commission’s strategy, the financial regulation and the fafa 
require that the decision-making process is objective and trans-
parent and aims for efficiency and effectiveness (see paragraphs 
8, 9 and 15). Whilst elements such as cost (see paragraphs 22 and 
23), speed (see paragraph 24) and visibility (see paragraph 25) 
were also considered, in the replies to the court’s questionnaires 
requesting the three main reasons for choosing the Un these cri-
teria did not feature prominently. 
  22.    concerning cost, the commission has limited information on the 
cost efficiency of implementation. the commission makes a contri-
bution, not exceeding 7 % of direct costs, to the Un organisation’s 
indirect costs11. article 5 of the fafa states that subcontracting 
should not lead to increased costs over direct implementation by 
the Un itself. however, when activities are subcontracted, the to-
tal level of the contribution to indirect costs for all organisations 
involved is not reported as, for example, in the case of the interim 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme in su-
dan, where one Un organisation subcontracted half the activities 
to another Un organisation which further subcontracted activities 
to ngos for implementation. 
  23.    in addition to its contribution to indirect costs, the commission 
also funds the support costs of local offices, staff and transport 
directly related to activities financed. an analysis of projects in 
sudan showed a range in the level of support costs of between 6 % 
and 60 % of the total project cost12. the commission does not as-
sess the level of support costs with reference to a normal range or 
benchmark for the type of project to establish if it is reasonable.
11  article 4.1 of the fafa states that 
a fixed percentage of direct eligible 
costs, not exceeding 7 %, shall be 
eligible to fund the indirect costs of 
Un organisations. the indirect costs 
funded by the commission are not 
separately identified by its financial 
systems. however, based on annual 
funding of over 1 billion euro and 
allowing for some projects which do 
not receive the 7 % contribution to 
indirect costs, the court estimates 
that the total annual contribution to 
indirect costs of Un organisations is 
in the order of 50 million euro per 
year.
12   the instance of 60 % support costs 
related to a food assistance project, 
and the support costs included local 
transport, storage and handling. the 
commission considered that these 
were extremely high due partly to 
conditions in darfur, but also to the 
need to streamline operations to be 
more cost-effective.special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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  24.    concerning speed of implementation, in some cases, for example 
the large quantities of food transported, the Un has demonstrated 
its capacity to deliver aid to beneficiaries rapidly. however, ex-
amples of slow delivery (see Box 1) should feed into the decision-
making process.
  25.    concerning visibility, the commission’s evaluation concluded that, 
whilst visibility was satisfactory at country level, EU taxpayers 
were generally not aware of the presence and role of the com-
mission in this type of intervention. in the case of the interim 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, for 
example, whilst the role of the Ec was clear at the level of the na-
tional administration in sudan, it was rarely mentioned in public 
and formal documents. the 2006 joint action plan on visibility 
recognises the risk of reduced visibility and emphasises the im-
portance of addressing this issue.
BOX 1
EXAMPLES OF SLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF AID
a november 2006 review of the interim disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme 
in sudan reported on the high level of frustration with delays and lack of implementation. in de-
cember 2007 the sudanese government expressed disappointment at the slow implementation of 
the programme, which was confirmed by a subsequent commission mission to sudan. 
in south sudan, Europeaid selected a Un organisation as a partner to supervise the emergency 
construction of legal offices. Beneficiaries agreed to a prefabricated construction which could be 
quickly delivered and assembled. however, they were frustrated by delays in implementation as 
foundations were initially dug in the wrong location, prefabricated panels were delivered late and 
the project manager departed.
the camp development project managed by a Un organisation in the occupied palestinian territory 
was initially planned for a period of 12 months ending in June 2007 but after two extensions was 
still continuing at the end of 2008.18
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FORMAL COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATIVE AID 
DELIVERY MECHANISMS SHOULD BE SYSTEMATIC
  26.    neither Europeaid nor Echo systematically carries out formal 
  appraisals of alternative aid delivery mechanisms. comparative 
or standard cost information is not used to analyse the cost-ef-
fectiveness of project proposals in order to compensate for the 
absence of competitive tendering. the choice of using a Un or-
ganisation to deliver aid, is not, therefore, supported by conclu-
sive evidence that this approach is more efficient and effective 
than other ways of delivering aid.
  27.    the replies to the court’s questionnaires indicated that where 
comparisons with alternatives were carried out they were gener-
ally not documented. the commission’s evaluation similarly found 
that there was no formalised appraisal of alternative forms of aid 
and little information could be found on any analysis of possi-
ble alternatives prior to the decision. however, even where there 
was little record of the decision-making process that had taken 
place, the commission was satisfied with its choices to deliver 
aid through Un organisations. channelling aid through the Un 
was frequently considered to have been the only option, particu-
larly in crisis situations. Where there had been other options the 
commission generally considered that the Un had been the best 
choice, despite the absence of systematically documented justi-
fications at the time when the decisions were taken. 
  28.    implementation by the commission itself is one of the other op-
tions for delivering aid. the lead role of the commission in the 
implementation of the temporary international mechanism in the 
occupied palestinian territory, through which over 600 million 
euro were channelled in 2006 and 2007, demonstrates the capac-
ity of the commission to implement and coordinate aid on a large 
scale in an unstable environment. article 18(1) of the revised fi-
nancial regulation explicitly states that commission programmes 
can be financed by financial contributions from member states 
and other donors, which provides an opportunity to explore the 
possibility of multi-donor funds managed and coordinated by the 
commission.special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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SECTION 3.2 
SYSTEMS FOR MONITORING AND AUDITING AID 
DELIVERED THROUGH THE UN 
  29.    robust financial management procedures are a legal and strategic 
requirement (see paragraphs 8 and 15). they are necessary in or-
der to reduce the risk that commission funding is used uneconom-
ically or inappropriately. reliable information on the efficiency 
of implementation and the achievement of results is necessary 
in order to ensure that the commission’s objectives have been 
met. the audit therefore examined whether monitoring and audit 
arrangements provide assurance on the robustness of financial 
procedures and on the achievement of results.
  30.    the commission has responded to the requirement to ensure ro-
bust financial management procedures by developing monitor-
ing and control mechanisms which combine prior approval and 
ex post checks13 (see Figure 5). the commission first carries out 
an assessment of the financial control systems of its Un partners 
(the four pillar analysis) to ensure they meet international stand-
ards14. in order to ensure that these systems operate in practice, 
the commission is provided with information by its Un partners 
through reports. the commission also conducts field monitoring 
visits and carries out verification missions. although not part of 
the commission’s monitoring procedures, the court of auditors 
also checks the eligibility of a sample of expenditure implemented 
through Un organisations as part of its annual financial audit of 
the commission’s accounts.
13  article 165 of the financial 
regulation states that the 
implementation of actions by 
international organisations is subject 
to scrutiny by the commission. such 
scrutiny shall be exercised either by 
prior approval, by ex post checks or 
by a combined procedure.
14   the commission defined 
benchmarks relative to each 
procedure as the basis for this 
assessment.20
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MONITORING AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS
FIGURE 5
THE FOUR PILLAR ANALYSIS DOES NOT COVER SYSTEMS 
RELATING TO SUBCONTRACTED ACTIVITIES
  31.    the four pillar analysis assesses the adequacy of the accounting, 
internal control, external audit and procurement procedures of Un 
partners. By 2008 it had been completed for nearly all commission 
funds managed through the Un. Whilst it was being carried out 
the commission continued to work with Un organisations on the 
basis of a presumption of conformity.
  32.    Un organisations frequently subcontract the implementation of 
activities to other organisations whose financial control systems 
have not been reviewed by the commission. for example, in the 
context of the Echo-financed emergency health care project in 
sudan, the Un organisation subcontracted activities to ngos 
which had not entered into a partnership agreement with Echo. 
the commission relies on the Un organisation’s systems to control 
the activities of the subcontractors. 
1. Four pillar analysis
Commission examination of the 
four main types of financial control 
(accounting, internal control, external 
audit and procurement) of UN  
organisations to check they meet 
international standards.
2. UN reports
UN organisations are required to provide 
annual progress reports plus a final 
report within six months of the end 
of  implementation (three months 
for humanitarian assistance). The 
annual strategy is supported through 
programming dialogues.
3. Field monitoring
Commission visits to projects and 
meetings with partners to ensure 
the efficiency of implementation and 
achievement of objectives. Includes 
results-oriented  monitoring (ROM).
4. Verifications
Commission checks, including  on 
the spot, to confirm the  adequacy of 
the procedures  identified in the four 
pillar  analysis and to examine whether 
value for money has been  obtained. In 
addition, evaluations check the efficiency 
and effectiveness of aid.
■  Prior approval
■  Ex post checksspecial report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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UN REPORTS PROVIDE INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON 
RESULTS
  33.    the commission is critical of Un reports which are excessively 
general, do not communicate problems encountered and are fre-
quently late15. the commission has not succeeded in obtaining 
adequate information on project achievements because clearly 
quantified output targets are not developed for all projects. When 
performance indicators are quantified they focus on the more 
easily measurable project output rather than project impact. the 
commission’s project cycle management guidelines (march 2004) 
distinguish between output indicators, on the one hand, and 
outcome and impact indicators, on the other. output indicators 
measure the immediate and concrete consequences of measures 
taken whilst outcome and impact indicators measure the effect of 
the project on beneficiaries and the long-term consequences. in 
some cases impact indicators were included but were not measur-
able, particularly within the shorter reporting timescale of Echo16 
(see Box 2).
15  over 70 % of the replies to the 
court’s questionnaires from Echo 
indicated that Un reports were late.
16   article 2.6 of the fafa requires 
a final report within three months 
after the end of implementation for 
humanitarian aid and six months in 
other cases.
BOX 2
DIFFICULTIES IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE
Where projects included both output and outcome indicators, the Un organisation was not neces-
sarily able to report on the outcome indicators within the reporting timescale. for example in the 
case of one Un project in darfur, sudan, an output target was for 25 000 households to receive 
seeds for crop production whilst the outcome target was for each beneficiary to cultivate an addi-
tional 1,2 hectares from the assistance provided. in the case of the Un health, nutrition and water 
project in Blue nile and khartoum states the output indicators related to the number of clinics sup-
ported whilst the outcome indicators concerned mortality and morbidity rates. although for both 
these Echo projects the Un organisations were able to report on the output indicators, they were 
unable, within the reporting timescale (three months after the end of the project), to report on the 
outcome indicators concerning the additional land cultivated or mortality and morbidity rates. 22
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  34.    the quality of reporting is important in the context of the aid ef-
fectiveness agenda and the aim of the commission and the Un to 
focus on results17. the 2005 paris declaration on aid Effectiveness 
commits donors to implementing common arrangements at coun-
try level for planning and funding activities. the 2005 European 
consensus on development similarly emphasises the EU’s commit-
ment to working with partners in harmonising aid through more 
predictable aid mechanisms. the good humanitarian donorship 
principles agreed in stockholm in 2003 commit donors to strive 
to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to Un organisa-
tions and to explore the possibility of reducing earmarking and 
introducing longer-term funding arrangements. Earmarking aid 
for a large number of specific activities can be a means to target 
resources in order to achieve specific results, but it is not consist-
ent with the common approach envisaged by the aid effectiveness 
agenda. however, partly due to inadequate reporting by the Un, 
the commission has preferred to earmark funds, rather than fund-
ing longer-term cooperation18. 
  35.    Even where the commission contributes to a multi-donor fund, 
instead of pooling its funding with the other donors it some-
times earmarks its funding for specific activities within that fund 
(see Box 3). Earmarking brings with it additional reporting re-
quirements and associated costs. the court’s 1999 annual report 
criticised the devotion of scarce Un and commission resources 
to the largely unproductive administrative task of reporting on 
earmarked expenditure19. the commission replied that it was look-
ing at new approaches which would take account of the court’s 
suggestion to reduce earmarking. the results of the court’s ques-
tionnaires showed that for 10 out of 29 multi-donor funds (34 %) 
the commission had earmarked its funds for specific activities.
17  the preamble to the fafa states ‘all 
activities undertaken hereunder are 
directed towards the attainment of 
results: humanitarian, developmental 
or otherwise. the shift to a results 
orientation should be accompanied 
by a corresponding shift away from 
the exclusive examination of inputs 
and activities.’ the april 2007 Joint 
guidelines on reporting under 
the fafa similarly emphasise the 
importance of focusing on results, in 
accordance with the Un’s results-
based management principles, to 
allow the commission to assess 
whether the objectives of the action 
have been met.
18  com(2001) 231 of 2.5.2001 
‘Building an effective partnership 
with the United nations in the fields 
of development and humanitarian 
affairs’ states that several obstacles, 
including inadequate reporting, 
have hindered the development 
of programmatic, longer-term 
cooperation.
19  court of auditors’ annual report 
concerning the financial year 1999.
BOX 3
EXAMPLE OF EARMARKING
the commission contributed 1 million euro to a Un organisation’s multi-donor fund of 14 mil-
lion euro to support elections in guyana in 2006. other donors including canada (cida) and the 
Uk (dfid) did not earmark their contributions for specific activities, but the commission did. for 
  example, it allocated 146 000 euro for information technology, 418 000 euro for voter education, 
143 000 euro for media monitoring and 115 000 for local observation. however, the Un organisa-
tion’s accounting systems did not record expenditure according to these budget headings and it 
was unable to provide the commission with a list of transactions in each category.  special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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  36.    the commission has not funded the general budget of Un bodies 
with the exception of a Un agency in the occupied palestinian 
territory20. By contributing to the general budget of this agency 
the commission was able to engage in a high-level dialogue to 
improve the system for measuring the organisation’s performance 
and providing clear and reliable information on the achievement 
of results. the current pilot Un initiative to present a single Un 
interface for donors in a particular country may, in the future, 
present a further opportunity for the commission to consider 
funding in a less fragmented way, ensuring greater harmonisation 
of aid. however, any move away from earmarking needs to be ac-
companied by a robust reporting system which provides donors 
with reliable information on the achievement of results.
COMMISSION FIELD MONITORING DOES NOT 
COMPENSATE FOR LACK OF INFORMATION  
IN UN REPORTS
  37.    Europeaid field monitoring by delegation staff includes meetings 
with Un staff, field visits to projects and beneficiaries and attend-
ance at steering committees. Un organisations, beneficiaries and 
other donors generally perceive Europeaid as a relatively involved 
donor. in addition, results-oriented monitoring (rom) visits, car-
ried out for Europeaid by consultants, assess a project’s relevance, 
efficiency, effectiveness, impact and potential sustainability. 
  38.    however, monitoring carried out by delegations and the rom is 
not designed to compensate for the limitations of Un reporting on 
the efficiency of implementation and achievement of results (see 
Box 4). the rom methodology is based on sampling, and security 
issues are also a consideration. the results of the court’s ques-
tionnaires showed that only seven out of 37 Europeaid projects 
(19 %) had been monitored through the rom.
20  the 2001 communication 
com(2001) 231 of 2.5.2001 ‘Building 
an effective partnership with the 
United nations’ stated that the 
commission was not, at that stage, 
recommending core contributions 
to the general budget of Un 
organisations as there would be no 
added value for the Ec simply to pass 
on the resources entrusted to it by 
member states to Un agencies as 
core contributions.24
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  39.    in contrast, Echo’s field officers systematically carry out moni-
toring visits to projects once every six months (except when it is 
not possible, for example, for security reasons) and document the 
findings. these monitoring reports are a useful tool for initiating 
any necessary remedial action, though their effectiveness could 
be enhanced by sharing the written report with partners instead 
of providing only verbal feedback. the monitoring by Echo field 
officers, together with visits of evaluators, missions by desk   
officers and annual strategic programming dialogues with Un orga-
nisations, helps to compensate for the limitations of Un reports.
BOX 4
LIMITATIONS OF EUROPEAID FIELD MONITORING
in sudan, commission aid was distributed evenly between the north and the south of the country. 
however, the delegation was based in khartoum in the north and there was only one programme 
manager working in the south, in particularly difficult conditions. the planned opening of the south 
office in Juba in 2009 will provide an opportunity to address this imbalance in the distribution of 
monitoring resources. 
Where projects encountered problems, as in the case of the emergency construction of legal offices 
in south sudan, delegation monitoring had not compensated for ineffective Un supervision.
in sri lanka, adequate monitoring and supervision procedures had not been established for the com-
munity roads project implemented by a Un organisation21.
21  European court of auditors’ special report no 6/2008: European commission rehabilitation aid following the tsunami and hurricane mitch 
(http://eca.europa.eu). the commission later reinforced independent quality control before the acceptance of finished works.special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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COMMISSION VERIFICATIONS QUESTIONED BY 
UN PANEL OF AUDITORS
  40.    the fafa states that the European communities may undertake, 
including on the spot, checks related to the operations financed 
by the European communities. the purpose of these checks is not 
only to review financial management systems, but also to examine 
whether value for money has been obtained in the implemen-
tation of projects. With some exceptions22, verification missions 
focus on the adequacy of procedures whereas examination of the 
efficiency of implementation or the effectiveness of results are 
issues addressed by Un reports and commission field monitoring. 
typical terms of reference of a verification mission are:
(a)  to evaluate the local systems for accounting for commission 
funding and confirm that they operate in practice; and
(b)  to check the eligibility of expenditure on the specific activi-
ties financed.
  41.    at the same time as the level of commission funds channelled 
through the Un has increased (see paragraph 1), the commis-
sion has increasingly exercised its right to carry out verifications. 
Between 2004 and 2006 Europeaid and Echo carried out a com-
bined total of 22 verification missions, or roughly seven per year. 
in 2007 the number significantly increased as Europeaid carried 
out 38 verification missions and Echo a further nine. in 2008 
Europeaid carried out 25 verification missions and Echo nine. to 
put the number of verification missions into context, Europeaid 
and  Echo each enter annually into approximately 180 contracts 
with Un organisations (see paragraph 5).
22  for example, the Echo 2008 
verification of projects implemented 
by a Un organisation for the support 
and protection of internally displaced 
persons in Uganda included a review 
of progress against indicators.26
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23  the Un Board of auditors consists 
of three auditors-general of Un 
member states and carries out 
the external audit of the financial 
statements of Un bodies. the role of 
the panel of External auditors, which 
includes the members of the Board of 
auditors, is to coordinate audits and 
exchange information on methods 
and findings.
  42.    attitudes towards verifications vary within the Un, but the Un 
panel of auditors has continually questioned the commission’s 
right to check expenditure, arguing that its own audit arrange-
ments are sufficient (see Box 5). the Un Board of auditors carries 
out the external audit of the financial statements of Un bodies23. 
the various Un agencies also have their own internal audit func-
tion. for example, one Un organisation has an office of audit and 
performance review which is required to audit each activity at 
least once in its lifetime. 
LONG-STANDING CONTROVERSY OVER COMMISSION VERIFICATIONS
BOX 5
in 1993 the Un panel of External auditors wrote to the secretary general of the Un insisting that 
donors should rely on normal Un audit arrangements. this view was endorsed by the Un general 
assembly.
in 1994, the verification clause was agreed, providing the basis for Ec access to all relevant Un 
information and the right to carry out checks, though stating that transactions and financial state-
ments were subject to Un internal and external auditing procedures. 
the Un panel of External auditors continued to voice its concerns over independent audits by 
donors and in 2001 a supplementary agreement was signed on the application of the verification 
clause.
in 2005 the Un high level committee on management claimed the exclusive right of audit of Un 
auditors, despite what it described as pressure from some donors, including the commission, to 
break the single audit principle.
in early 2008 the Un controller requested all verification missions to be put on hold until the veri-
fication clause, considered contrary to the independence of the Un, was renegotiated or removed. 
the commission refused the request.
in april 2008 the question of verifications was the main subject discussed at the fifth annual fafa 
working group. the Un and the commission agreed to draft common terms of reference for verifi-
cation missions, which were adopted at the sixth annual working group in april 2009.special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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  43.    the commission relies on the work of the Un auditors when  it 
is available for review and scrutiny24. the audited financial state-
ments of the Un organisation as a whole are publicly available. 
however, the financial statements of actions funded by the com-
mission are not separately audited. 
  44.    the commission and Un have worked to overcome their differ-
ences regarding verifications but the commission has encountered 
restricted access to Un systems and documents (see Box 6).
24  international standard on auditing 
600 on Using the Work of another 
auditor; international standard on 
auditing 402 on audit considerations 
relating to an Entity Using a third 
party service organisation; opinion 
no 2/2004 of the court of auditors 
on the ‘single audit’ model (oJ c 107, 
30.4.2004, p. 1).
BOX 6
EXAMPLES OF RESTRICTED COMMISSION ACCESS
Europeaid’s 2007 verification of a Un organisation’s support to elections in guyana could not ac-
cess the Un organisation’s accounting system.
Europeaid’s 2007 verification of a Un organisation’s polio eradication programme was not allowed 
to take copies of documents. 
due to limitations imposed by the hQ of one Un organisation, Echo’s 2008 verification of projects 
in Uganda was not able to select a reasonable number of transactions for testing in order to arrive 
at a general conclusion on the eligibility of costs.28
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COURT OF AUDITORS ENCOUNTERS OBSTACLES 
CARRYING OUT FINANCIAL CHECKS
  45.    in order to carry out its annual financial audit of the commission’s 
accounts, the court of auditors checks the eligibility of a random 
sample of payments25. for those transactions relating to the Un, 
the court checks that expenditure has been incurred in accord-
ance with the terms of the agreement with the commission. 
  46.    the commission ensured that the verification clause of the fafa 
provided the court of auditors with the necessary access to infor-
mation in order to perform these checks26. the verification clause 
of the fafa states that the European communities, and therefore 
the court, even though not specifically mentioned, may undertake 
on-the-spot financial checks, and that the Un shall provide all 
relevant financial information. nevertheless, the court has expe-
rienced some difficulties accessing Un information (see Box 7). 
25  the court is required by article 
248 of the Ec treaty to provide the 
parliament and the council with 
a statement of assurance as to 
the reliability of the accounts and 
the legality and regularity of the 
underlying transactions.
26  article 43.4(h) of the 
implementing rules on the financial 
regulation states that agreements 
concluded with international 
organisations shall contain provisions 
granting the court of auditors 
access to the information required 
to perform its duties.
COURT OF AUDITORS HAS DIFFICULTIES ACCESSING INFORMATION
BOX 7
the court’s annual reports for 2001 and 2004 describe the difficulties of the court in accessing 
data from Un organisations.
the court’s 2007 audit of the European development funds reported that out of 11 payments to 
Un organisations, two payments could not be fully audited because the court could not obtain 
the underlying documentation. the audit of other Un payments was hampered by inadequate 
cooperation by Un organisations and was eventually made possible only by the intervention of 
the commission. 
the court’s 2007 annual report on the general budget reported that for three payments to Un 
organisations some of the documents needed could not be provided in good time by the organi-
sations concerned.special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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  47.    the European consensus on development commits the EU to coordi-
nate and harmonise aid in close cooperation with Un organisations. 
the 2003 financial regulation and the fafa provide the framework 
enabling the commission to contract directly with Un organisa-
tions. the commission remains accountable for tasks delegated 
to Un organisations. on the basis of the financial regulation and 
the arrangements in the fafa, it therefore checks that Un financial 
procedures meet international standards and seeks confirmation on 
the practical operation of these systems and on the achievement 
of results through Un reports and its own verifications and field 
monitoring. 
DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT AID THROUGH THE UN
  48.    the process for deciding to implement aid through the Un does 
not demonstrate that this is the most efficient and effective op-
tion. in order to compensate for the absence of competition, the 
commission has recognised the need for robust decision-making 
procedures in choosing its implementing partner. however, the 
strategic and legal requirements are insufficiently translated into 
practical criteria to support decision-making. Before deciding to 
work with a Un organisation, the commission does not convincingly 
demonstrate that the advantages offset any disadvantages. nor is 
the choice of using a Un organisation to deliver aid supported by 
sufficient evidence to show that this approach is more efficient and 
effective than other ways of delivering aid. 
chaptEr 4 
conclUsions and 
rEcommEndations
the commission should issue and ensure the implementation 
of practical guidelines in order to improve the decision-
making process for selecting the implementing channel for 
the proposed task. the guidelines should lead to a transparent, 
objective and systematic demonstration that the choice is more 
efficient and effective than other aid delivery mechanisms.
RECOMMENDATION 130
special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
SYSTEMS FOR MONITORING AND AUDITING AID 
DELIVERED THROUGH THE UN
  49.    monitoring arrangements do not provide adequate information 
on the robustness of financial procedures and on the achievement 
of objectives. Un reports do not systematically provide adequate 
information on project achievements and whilst monitoring by 
the commission provides complementary information, it is insuf-
ficient to fully compensate for these limitations. the Un panel of 
External auditors has continually questioned the commission’s 
right to check expenditure and the court of auditors has also 
encountered difficulties accessing information. 
the commission should continue to explore opportunities to 
rely on audit work carried out by Un bodies and continue to 
ensure that the fafa is applied so that any issues of access to 
information are rapidly resolved.
RECOMMENDATION 2
in order to respond to the aid effectiveness agenda, the 
commission should ensure that Un reports provide adequate 
information on project performance and the achievement of 
results including the achievement of longer-term impact not 
measurable within the existing reporting time-frame.
RECOMMENDATION 3
RECOMMENDATION 4
Europeaid should ensure that its field monitoring provides 
adequate coverage of projects implemented through Un 
organisations to supplement and confirm the information on 
results obtained from Un reports. special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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RECOMMENDATION 5
the commission should consider whether it can build on 
its experience with one Un agency by contributing in a less 
frag  mented way, for example at country level, to other Un 
organisations with a view to engaging in a similar high-level 
dialogue enhancing the focus on their performance in achieving 
objectives.
this report was adopted by the court of auditors in luxembourg at its 
meeting of 22 october 2009.
For the Court of Auditors
Vítor manuel da silva caldeira 
President32
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rEplY of thE 
commission
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I.
Between 2001 and 2003 the European 
  Union  adopted  a  new  policy  approach 
to  partnership  with  the  United  na-
tions. this was reinforced in the 2003   
financial regulation, which introduced 
the concept of joint management, specifi-
cally to enable the European commission 
(Ec) to channel funds through internation-
al organisations using the own procedures 
of those organisations. an agreement was 
reached with the Un in 2003 — the finan-
cial and administrative framework agree-
ment (fafa) — which clarifies the respon-
sibilities of the commission and the Un in 
the management of EU funds. these de-
velopments have enabled the EU to join 
with other donors in supporting the Un in 
major rehabilitation   programmes.
III.
the  commission  decides  to  channel 
funds through Un organisations for vari-
ous reasons. in some cases there is no 
alternative, e.g. the Un has a clear man-
date to act on behalf of the international 
community, or it has specific expertise 
not found elsewhere. in other cases the 
Un has been identified as the only al-
ternative with the required logistical or 
management capacity for the operation 
in question. the Un has also frequently 
been selected as a partner because of its 
experience and ability to work in a post-
crisis environment and its in-country 
presence in such situations. special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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over the last four years Europeaid has 
carried out surveys of its delegations to 
improve information on their reasons for 
channelling funds through the Un, and 
they are therefore well known — there 
must be doubts that other solutions, 
where they existed, would have been 
more effective. moreover, as a result of 
the recent evaluation, all Europeaid ser-
vices and delegations have been instruct-
ed  to  document  more  carefully  their 
reasons for proposing to channel funds 
through the Un. 
Each  proposal  submitted  by  an  Echo 
partner is assessed not only on its own 
merits but also in comparison to other 
proposals to ensure the complementa-
rity of actions in the design and delivery 
of aid. furthermore, Echo does impose 
competitive tendering requirements on 
partners when they procure goods and 
services needed for the delivery of hu-
manitarian aid.
IV. 
in 2007 the Un and the commission 
agreed  on  joint  reporting  guidelines 
which are significantly improving the 
quality of Un reporting, particularly on 
financial aspects. on the achievement of 
objectives, a joint monitoring system is 
being developed. however the commis-
sion's own field monitoring system is de-
signed to complement the reporting of 
others.
the  Un  continues  to  provide  reports 
on implementation of humanitarian aid 
which allows the commission to assess 
the efficiency and achievement of hu-
manitarian objectives. the commission 
has comprehensive monitoring systems 
based on a network of over 100 tech  nical 
assistants  operating  in  the  field.  Each 
project is monitored in the field.
V. 
Verification is one of the means at the 
disposal of the commission to obtain as-
surance on the use of Ec funds by inter-
national organisations. it is foreseen in 
the financial regulation and the respec-
tive framework agreements. in general, 
most Un agencies cooperate very well in 
the verification process and this coop-
eration continues to improve. in fact in 
2009 the Ec and the Un agreed on com-
mon terms of reference for verification 
missions. these missions allow the Ec to 
obtain evidence on Un financial control 
procedures. the commission therefore 
disagrees with the court's view. 
the  commission  fully  supports  the 
court's requests for information from the 
Un agencies in the framework of the fi-
nancial  and  administrative  framework 
agreement (fafa).
rEplY of thE 
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INTRODUCTION
1.
the increase in contributions from the 
commission to the Un is not a constantly 
rising trend. While the Ec is an important 
partner for the Un, the importance of Ec 
funding to the Un is often exaggerated. 
in fact Ec funding to the Un varies by 
agency, and, according to the Un, it rep-
resents, on average, between 3 % and 8 % 
of Un resources. 
the importance of the partnership re-
sides more in the nature and variety of 
the work that the Ec and the Un do to-
gether on programmes that range from 
important policy and normative to major 
rehabilitation and post-crisis interven-
tions and less in the annual fluctuations 
in contributions. 
4.
With regard to the Un agency in the oc-
cupied palestinian territory, the com-
mission's main contribution is to the 
agency's general fund to support the 
agency's crucial core programme serv-
ices in the areas of health, education and 
social services. the commission's contri-
bution is essentially used to pay salaries 
for teachers, doctors and social workers 
active in the refugee camps. the commis-
sion provides additional support through 
ad hoc projects and through Echo. 
it should be noted that the commission is 
a member of one Un organisation. as such 
it pays an annual membersip fee, which 
in 2009 amounted to 264 002,50 euro.
 
7.
the European parliament, during the 2007 
discharge discussions, repeating earlier 
statements, called on the commission to 
establish a European instrument to man-
age multi-donor trust funds itself, par-
ticularly for the implementation of crisis 
management. the commission has stated 
that it is in favour of this, provided that 
the financial regulation is modified to 
allow it, which is not the case at present. 
the commission disagrees that there is 
a lack of transparency and visibility con-
cerning its funding through the Un and 
considers that the actions it has under-
taken contribute to enhancing transpar-
ency further.
9.
the  commission  procedures  on  joint 
management are based on a full apprais-
al of the Un organisations in the areas of 
accounting,  audit,  internal  control  and 
procurement, as required by article 53d 
of the financial regulation.
ngos, on the other hand, given the het-
erogeneity of their systems, do not uni-
formly offer similar strengths. conse-
quently they are subjected to provisions 
related to the direct management mode 
foreseen by the financial regulation.
10.
in  addition  to  the  fafa,  the  standard 
contribution agreement also incorpo-
rates  all  the  requirements  emanating 
from the financial regulation.
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OBSERVATIONS
16.
the six thematic areas mentioned in the 
council's november 2000 statement and 
in the European community's develop-
ment policy were proposed for develop-
ment interventions by the commission, 
co-ordinated with member states. it is 
not expected that the commission should 
channel funds through international or-
ganisations in these areas only. the add-
ed value of the Un lies in areas identified 
separately, namely reconstruction (large 
multi-donor trust funds), areas covered 
by a specific mandate (such as UnrWa or 
Wfp) and specific expertise (such as Who 
on health policies and pandemics).
the 2001 commission communication on 
‘Building an effective partnership with 
the United nations’ takes the coopera-
tion with the Un beyond these six areas. 
it should also be noted that the adoption 
of the European consensus in 2005, which 
sets out the EU vision of development, no 
longer refers to the thematic areas men-
tioned in the earlier 2000 document.
17. 
as a result of the evaluation of commis-
sion’s external cooperation with partner 
countries through the organisations of 
the Un family1, and since the time of the 
audit, instructions were issued to staff in 
Europeaid and in delegations on 17 June 
2009. these instructions require them to 
record their assessment, when identify-
ing proposals for financing through the 
Un, of the added value of this approach. 
the assessment process will therefore   
be  more  systematically  and  clearly 
  documented.
1  http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation_reports/ 
2008/1252_docs_en.htm
the annual action programmes, as re-
vised  in  2008,  require  information  on 
the implementing partners selected to 
be included, including the reasons for 
choosing the organisation and, if known 
and where appropriate, the name of the 
partners that the organisation will use to 
implement the action and the reasons for 
this arrangement.
in the implementation of humanitarian 
aid the commission does not favour ei-
ther the Un agencies or its other partners 
(ngos or other international organisa-
tions). the commission selects the part-
ners on the basis of suitability and com-
pleteness of the proposals for a specific 
intervention presented in relation to the 
needs of victims of man-made and natu-
ral disasters.
the evaluation found that ‘decisions to 
channel funds were, in the majority of 
cases  examined,  based  on  documented 
studies. for the others, little document-
ed evidence could be retrieved on the 
rationale of the decisions, but commis-
sion staff generally consider that the de-
cisions were justified.’
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18.
the instructions issued by Europeaid to 
delegation staff ensure that any proposal 
to channel funds through an internation-
al organisation is backed up with a clear 
written justification (see instruction note 
of 17 June 2009). in addition, the ana-
lyses of the section on international or-
ganisations included in the twice yearly 
external assistance management reports 
(Eamrs) have been communicated to op-
erational staff and delegations.
other initiatives have also been taken 
including, for example, the production 
of various methodological guidelines, 
the most recent of which covers techni-
cal cooperation, selected assessments of 
our Un partners, the production of a set 
of frequently asked question on inter-
national  organisations  and  training 
courses of relevance to staff working with 
international organisations.
19.
monitoring information on all the past 
and current projects is now readily acces-
sible to all desk officers.
the commission is fully aware of the im-
plementation capacity and strengths of 
individual Un agencies implementing hu-
manitarian aid. the information on their 
past and planned activities in relation to 
ongoing and recurrent humanitarian cri-
ses is annually and individually revised 
in the ‘strategic programming dialogue’  
meetings.
20.
the  commission  decides  to  channel 
funds through Un organisations for vari-
ous reasons. in some cases there is no 
alternative, e.g. the Un has a clear man-
date to act on behalf of the international 
community, or it has specific expertise 
not found elsewhere. in other cases the 
Un has been identified as the only al-
ternative with the required logistical or 
management capacity for the operation 
in question. the Un has also frequently 
been selected as a partner because of its 
experience and ability to work in a post-
crisis environment and its in-country 
presence in such situations. these rea-
sons are reflected in the answers to the 
court's questionnaire.
21.
With regard to the decision making pro-
cess and the replies to the court's ques-
tionnaire on this matter, the fact that an 
element is not indicated as one of the 
main three factors for decision does not 
mean that it is being disregarded or ne-
glected. these factors have been taken 
into consideration as additional reasons 
but were not always considered among 
the  three  most  relevant  depending  on 
the situation.
funding for humanitarian aid is prima-
rily directed to the areas of highest need 
and the capacity to deliver. considera-
tions of cost and speed of delivery are 
also of great importance and for all large 
projects special attention is paid to the 
visibility component. the decision-mak-
ing process is finalised by the authoris-
ing officer.
rEplY of thE 
commissionspecial report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
37
special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
22. 
Under article 5 of the fafa, the Un is 
obliged to provide the commission with 
details of contracting arrangements and is 
asked to ensure that this should not lead 
to increased costs over direct implemen-
tation. the commission considers that the 
case mentioned is not substantiated as 
leading to increased cost over direct im-
plementation. however, the commission 
will ensure that it receives this informa-
tion from the Un organisation for the case 
mentioned when the final report in re-
spect of the action is presented and, if not 
satisfied that article 5 has been complied 
with, will consider appropriate corrective 
measures, possibly including a recovery 
order against the Un organisation.
in the case of humanitarian aid, the com-
mission only supports direct costs of the 
intermediary. these may include payments 
to other organisations. the payments 
made by the Un must be in line with its 
normal procedures, for activities directly 
related to the project and be in the time-
frame given by the project objectives.
23. 
the context in which aid is delivered in 
sudan is particularly complex and diffi-
cult. Without adequate transport, stor-
age and handling, there is a risk that the 
food would be damaged or not arrive at 
the final beneficiaries.  southern sudan 
and darfur are two regions where infra-
structure is very poor, the private sector 
inexistent and qualified staff very diffi-
cult to find and very expensive. all this 
results  in  support  costs  being  higher 
than what might be considered usual in 
other places. this implies that enhanced 
supervision is needed. such costs are di-
rect costs according to the first indent of 
article 3.2 of the fafa.
the commission funds the support costs 
in so far as they are costs incurred direct-
ly related to the provision of humanitar-
ian aid.
24. 
in addition to the example of food trans-
ported, cited by the court, the commis-
sion channels aid through the Un in other 
areas where the capacity of the Un to de-
liver quickly is well known, in particular 
post crisis and rehabilitation. the Evalua-
tion of the Commission's external coopera-
tion with partner countries through the or-
ganisations of the UN family cites positive 
examples  of  funds  channelled  through 
the Un in crisis or post-crisis situations, 
where the attributes of the Un (e.g. neu-
trality, expertise, field presence) were in-
strumental in ensuring that Ec assistance 
reached beneficiaries.
the Eamrs have been adapted to high-
light those programmes where delays oc-
cur so as initiate remedial action. thus, 
such experiences feed into the decision-
making process. 
rEplY of thE 
commission38
special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
Box 1 — Examples of slow 
  implementation of aid
it is true that implementation of the 
  interim disarmament, demobilisation and 
  reintegration programme (iddrp) man-
aged by a Un organisation in sudan was 
delayed. however, until June 2008 this 
was largely due to the lack of political 
will on the part of the signatories to the 
cpa (comprehensive peace agreement). 
this was a factor beyond the Un organisa-
tion’s control, and is also why the delega-
tion and the government of sudan agreed 
to an extension of the project until June 
2009 without additional costs. however, 
although the disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration process kicked off after 
June 2008, there were still some additional 
delays.
the second extension focused on concrete 
and clearly visible activities. the remain-
ing original activities which, for political 
reasons, could not be implemented by the 
end of June 2009 are being financed by 
other donors. 
the slowness of implementation of the 
  iddrp has been regularly raised with the 
Un organisation. 
the challenging context of south sudan 
must be factored in. With regard to the 
construction of the legal offices, while it 
is true that the partner underperformed, 
it would be incorrect to lay the blame en-
tirely on them but also on partly obstruc-
tive beneficiaries. the delegation has fol-
lowed up this project closely and when it 
became apparent that implementation was 
not only progressing slowly but that the 
options submitted by the partner for an 
extension would lead to a substantial re-
duction in the scope of works, the decision 
was taken not to endorse the request. 
the camp development project had two 
components: a socioeconomic survey 
of palestinian refugees in all fields and 
the camp development component. Both 
components were interrelated. the first 
task was highly complex and took long-
er to complete than anticipated. recon-
struction is a sensitive issue as it can be 
seen as compromising the right to return 
and considerable time was spent by the 
Un organisation to explain the approach 
to refugees and to get them on board.
the Un organisation was granted the 
flexibility to fulfil the objectives of the 
programme due to the importance of the 
outputs of the initiative and to enable it 
to institutionalise this fundamental ap-
proach within its camp development pro-
gramme and department serving millions 
of refugees in the occupied palestinian 
territory, syria, Jordan and   lebanon.
25. 
the commission has made huge efforts in 
recent years to ensure that contributions 
through the Un receive appropriate vis-
ibility and that the results of community 
interventions are communicated widely. 
the Un is aware of its obligations under 
the fafa and has committed itself at the 
highest level to ensure that the letter and 
spirit of these provisions are respected. 
Joint visibility guidelines were adopted 
and included in the communication and 
Visibility manual for EU External actions 
in april 2008. these initiatives and com-
mitments combine to ensure that the Ec 
receives appropriate visibility when part-
nering with the Un. 
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feedback from delegations through their 
regular reporting shows that this issue is 
being addressed at field level and efforts 
are also made to ensure that information 
from the field is communicated to an EU 
audience. in general, the conclusions of 
verification missions are also positive in 
relation to visibility.
in addition the Un itself has, since 2006, 
prepared an annual partnership report, 
which presents the results of the Un–EU 
partnership in development and humani-
tarian cooperation to a wide audience.
26. 
the instructions issued by Europeaid to 
delegation staff ensure that any proposal 
to channel funds through an internation-
al organisation is backed up with a clear 
written justification. these instructions 
require them to record their assessment, 
when identifying proposals for financing 
through  the  Un,  of  the  added  value  of 
this approach and to take account of al-
ternatives and cost-effectiveness issues.
furthermore,  the  commission  carries 
out an evaluation of both partners and 
projects where the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of aid delivery is examined. 
these evaluations are publicly available. 
regarding humanitarian aid, please see 
reply to paragraph 48.
27. 
for  humanitarian  aid,  the  commission 
will  ensure  a  better  documentation  of 
the alternatives and complementarities 
considered.
28. 
the financial regulation foresees the 
possibility of member states providing 
contributions directly to the commis-
sion's budget when allowed by the legal 
base.
32. 
in June 2009, the terms of reference in 
use to conduct the compliance assess-
ment  exercise  were  modified  and  now 
provide for an assessment of how the en-
tity controls the systems of other entities 
where it uses procedures other than its 
own (e.g. local systems of the beneficiary 
country or of the implementing body) to 
implement projects/programmes.
When conferring a task to a Un agency, 
the commission, in accordance with the 
financial regulation, uses joint man-
agement as the mode of operation. this 
results in the Un agency using its pro-
cedures for the implementation of hu-
manitarian aid. the Un agency may con-
fine some implementation tasks to other 
parties acting under the Un's responsibil-
ity. in the case cited, the output achieved 
was the added value in terms of the Un 
organisation coordinating the emergen-
cy response which involved many other 
  actors.
33. 
the commission recognises that the 
quality and timing of Un reporting is not 
optimal. this matter continually receives 
commission  attention  and  reporting  is 
also addressed in the instruction issued 
by Europeaid to delegations already 
mentioned.
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reporting guidelines adopted in 2007 
clarify the responsibilities of the Un and 
have resulted in improvements. report-
ing is also regularly discussed with the 
Un. as a result, further clarifications were 
provided in the frequently asked ques-
tions, which were posted on the Europe-
aid website in January 2009. 
the commission appreciates the need for 
outcome  and  impact  indicators  and,  in 
common with other donors, has been work-
ing to establish such indicators. never-
theless, the development of such meas-
ures is difficult and there is no consensus 
among donors on how best to measure 
results in a satisfactory way. Europeaid 
has, on the basis of ex post monitoring 
reports, recently completed a study of 
those factors which determine good or 
poor performance. the commission has 
also initiated the development of joint 
monitoring methods which could be car-
ried out with Un agencies, should the Un 
decide to participate in this endeavour. 
Box 2 — Difficulties in measuring  
performance
to overcome the difficulties associated 
with short reporting timescales, the com-
mission carries out evaluations of hu-
manitarian activities which also includes 
the impact of humanitarian aid.
34. 
the commission is exploring ways to re-
duce earmarking in accordance with its 
international commitments. however, it 
must be borne in mind that for operation-
al, technical or legal reasons earmarking 
may be necessary. this is the case, for ex-
ample for Edf programmes, where legal 
constraints apply, in that the money allo-
cated can only be spent in acp countries.
in the area of humanitarian aid most mul-
ti donor grants are earmarked to comply 
with the humanitarian aid regulation in 
terms, for example, of project duration 
limits. 
the commission also strives to ensure 
that, in the absence of earmarking, pro-
grammes have clearly identified objec-
tives where results can be demonstrated 
and monitored. 
35.
Earmarking only occurs for reasons men-
tioned in paragraph 34 and the associ-
ated costs are necessary and cannot be 
considered  as  an  unproductive  use  of 
  resources.
Box 3 — Example of earmarking
commission support to the elections in 
guyana was decided before it was known 
that other donors would be involved and 
before it was known that a Un organisa-
tion would coordinate. the commission 
negotiated  initially  with  the  Elections 
commission  and  decided  to  finance  a 
number of activities it wanted to support 
and, so as to avoid further changes and 
delays, it maintained this earmarked ap-
proach. in the end, Uk and cida opted 
for non-earmarked funding through the 
Un organisation, and Usaid granted its 
funding directly to the Elections commis-
sion. as regards the recording of expendi-
ture in the Un accounting system, the Un 
is moving to activity-based budgeting, 
making reconciliation according to con-
tribution agreement budget headings an 
onerous task. the commission does not 
insist on a particular budget format for 
the Un and formulating the budget from 
the outset in accordance with the Un's 
accounting system would facilitate un-
derstanding and subsequent reporting.
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36. 
the  commission  agrees  with  the  court 
that by contributing to the general budg-
et of a Un agency it was able to engage 
in a high-level dialogue to improve the 
system for measuring the organisation’s 
performance and providing clear and re-
liable information on the achievement of 
results. 
38. 
rom is a comprehensive and result-
  oriented  monitoring  system  which  can 
complement insufficient self-monitoring 
carried out by the implementing agen-
cies as it provides a good overview of 
the implementation of the projects with 
clearly defined criteria. rom is based on 
sampling, with the coverage varying de-
pending on factors such as project size 
and accessibility to the project at field 
level (due to security and other consid-
erations). the coverage of projects may 
also vary by region and is not necessarily 
different for Un-implemented projects. 
the commission has initiated the de-
velopment of joint monitoring methods 
which could be carried out with Un agen-
cies, should the Un decided to partici-
pate in this endeavour.
Box 4 — Limitations of EuropeAid  
field monitoring 
the opening of an office in Juba was de-
layed for staffing and security reasons. 
a  limited  but  permanent  presence  was 
ensured since early 2006 by the commis-
sion and an EU compound was opened in 
august 2009.
the project run by a Un organisation in 
south sudan for the construction of legal 
offices progressed well for the first year 
with regular updates and steering com-
mittee meetings. When it became clear 
that delays were affecting implementa-
tion the delegation reinforced monitoring 
and kept very regular contact with the Un 
organisation leading to the decision not 
to endorse a requested extension.
in sri lanka, the commission has since re-
inforced its independent quality control 
before the acceptance of finished works.
40. 
the commission avails itself of a number 
of tools to provide assurance on the 
use of community funds. in addition to 
the verification missions, other areas of 
control include the compliance analysis 
process, which checks that the account-
ing, internal control, external audit and 
procurement procedures of Un agencies 
comply with international standards. the 
commission also places reliance on re-
porting by the organisations themselves, 
insisting  that  reports  focus  on  results 
and reviewing, as necessary, the fre-
quency and content of reports. internal 
monitoring, including field monitoring 
and management reporting, complement 
these tools. together these various tools 
provide the commission with assurance 
that funds are being managed properly 
and in line with the highest international 
standards. 
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41. 
the number of verification missions to 
the Un has indeed increased over the 
years to reach a peak in the 2007 annual 
plan. however, the verification missions 
are one amongst other tools at the dis-
posal of the commission to obtain assur-
ance on the proper use of its funds.
42. 
attitudes towards verification vary but 
are  progressing  positively. Verification 
missions  are  performed  on  a  regular 
basis, contacts are intense with the Un 
representatives in Brussels to clarify any 
misunderstanding, common tors for veri-
fication mission, have been agreed upon 
between the Ec and the Un and common   
Ec–Un trainings are being held present-
ing, inter alia, the verification clause and 
missions.  approximately  150  Un  staff 
have followed the trainings so far.
Box 5 — Long-standing controversy 
over Commission verifications
the commission continues to recognise 
and respect the right of audit of Un au-
ditors. it also subscribes to the single 
audit principle. for its part the Un rec-
ognises the commission's right to obtain 
assurance on the use of its funds. these 
principles are retained in the verification 
clause of the fafa. 
in response to the request of the Un con-
troller to put the verification missions on 
hold, the commission refused and took 
the view that verification missions are 
not audits as there are significant differ-
ences, for example, in objectives, scope 
and levels of testing.
43.
the commission does indeed rely on the 
work of the Un auditors to obtain assur-
ance on the use of Ec funds since it offers 
guarantees equivalent to internationally 
accepted standards, as appraised by the 
compliance  assessments.  as  additional 
means  to  obtain  assurance  for  actions 
funded by it, the commission also relies 
on the verification clause.
the commission is bound by its finan-
cial regulation (article 53d) and its im-
plementing rules (article 35(4)), which 
states that where the commission imple-
ments the budget by joint management, 
the verification agreements shall apply. 
the commission has consistently defend-
ed its right to carry out verification mis-
sions, and through the adoption of the 
common terms of reference for verifica-
tion missions has sought to improve the 
way in which these missions are carried 
out.
the commission will continue to explore 
further means of obtaining assurance on 
the actions it funds through the Un sys-
tem of audit and control.
44.
the  increasing  number  of  verification 
missions  over  recent  years  has  indeed 
generated discussions on the implemen-
tation of the missions. however, most of 
the problems were addressed with the Un 
representations in Brussels and the com-
mission believes that significant progress 
has been made that allows smooth con-
duct of the overall verification missions' 
process.
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Box 6 — Examples of restricted  
Commission access
With regard to the commission's support 
to the election in guyana, the security 
protocols of the Un organisation restrict-
ed the access to the accounting system. 
however, as stated in the verification 
mission report, the mission was provided 
with a detailed transaction listing of each 
donor's funds and access to supporting 
documentation.
the court notes that documents were not 
allowed to be copied by the team veri-
fying the polio eradiction programme. 
according to the terms of the fafa, pro-
vision of copies of documents is not an 
obligation and can even be subject to the 
agreement of the Un Board of auditors. 
however, in the case of most verification 
missions, no difficulties have been expe-
rienced in this regard. 
the difficulties encountered in 2008 in 
the verification process were addressed 
in the fafa working group which defined 
common terms of reference for verifica-
tion. these were since satisfactorily test-
ed by Echo in a recent verification mis-
sion in June 2009 in Burundi.
45. 
the court was present as observer at 
both the fifth and sixth annual fafa 
  working  groups. the  minutes  of  the 
fifth working group record that ‘the Euro-
pean court of auditors and the Un panel 
of External auditors are strongly encour-
aged to discuss urgently the application 
of the single audit principle to provide 
assurance to the Ec.’
46. 
in addition to the provisions of the fafa, 
the right of access of the court to infor-
mation is specifically mentioned in arti-
cle 16.4 of the general conditions of the 
standard contribution agreement with an 
international organisation. 
the commission has fully supported the 
court’s requests for obtaining from Un 
organisations necessary supporting evi-
dence, and this principle is clearly stipu-
lated in the fafa. Where the commission 
is informed by the court of difficulties 
encountered in this respect, it can ap-
proach its counterparts at the Un in order 
to find a solution and to ensure that the 
court receives the information required.
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CONCLUSIONS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS
48.
following consideration of the evalua-
tion of channelling of funds through the 
Un, instructions were issued to staff in 
Europeaid and in delegations on 17 June 
2009. these instructions require them to 
record their assessment, when identify-
ing proposals for financing through the 
Un, of the added value of this approach, 
and to take account of alternatives and 
cost effectiveness issues.
Echo provides funding on a needs-based 
approach. it receives funding proposals 
from  both  ngos  as  from  international 
organisations. Each of these proposals 
is scrutinised and assessed on its own 
merits on the basis of a detailed logical 
framework. it is also compared to other 
proposals to ensure complementarity and 
best value for money. in many cases, the 
Un is often the only possible means to 
ensure that goods are delivered to the 
beneficiaries.
Recommendation 1
instructions  on  working  with  inter-
national organisations were issued to 
staff in Europeaid and in delegations on 
17 June 2009. 
49.
robustness of financial procedure is as-
sessed ex ante by the four pillar review 
for each organisation. Quality of imple-
mentation of financial procedures is as-
sessed at field level during verification 
missions. therefore the commission con-
siders that monitoring arrangements do 
provide adequate information on the ro-
bustness of financial procedures.
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the commission is bound by its financial 
regulation (article 53d) and its imple-
menting rules (article 35(4)) which states 
that where the commission implements 
the budget by joint management, the 
verification agreement shall apply. the 
commission has consistently defended 
its right to carry out verification missions, 
and through the adoption of the common 
terms of reference for verification mis-
sions has sought to improve the way in 
which these missions are carried out.
in 2007 the Un and the commission 
agreed on joint reporting guidelines 
which are significantly improving the 
quality of Un reporting, particularly on 
financial aspects.
the rom is a comprehensive and result-
oriented system which can complement 
self-monitoring carried out by the imple-
menting agencies. additionally the com-
mission has initiated the development of 
joint monitoring methods which could be 
carried out with Un agencies, should Un 
decided to engage in this endeavour.
the commission has fully supported the 
court’s requests for obtaining from Un 
organisations necessary supporting evi-
dence, and this principle is clearly stipu-
lated in the fafa. Where the commission 
is informed by the court of difficulties en-
countered in this respect, it can approach 
its counterparts at the Un in order to find 
a solution and to ensure that the court 
receives the information required.special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring
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Recommendation 2
the commission is already relying on au-
dit work of the Un and will continue to 
explore further means of obtaining assur-
ance on the actions it funds through the 
Un system of audit and control.
it already considers that it constantly en-
sures that the fafa is applied as regards 
the verification clause.
Recommendation 3
in 2007 the Un and the commission 
agreed  on  joint  reporting  guidelines 
which are significantly improving the 
quality of Un reporting, particularly on 
financial aspects. the reporting guide-
lines stress the need to focus on results 
(see also reply to paragraph 33).
Recommendation 4
the commission is monitoring Un-imple-
mented projects according to its crite-
ria. rom is based on sampling, with the 
coverage varying depending on factors 
such as project size and accessibility to 
the project at field level (due to security 
and other considerations). the coverage 
of projects may also vary by region and 
is not necessarily different for Un-imple-
mented projects.
the commission has already initiated the 
development of joint monitoring meth-
ods which could be carried out with Un 
agencies.
Recommendation 5
the  experience  with  one  Un  agency  is 
very useful, and the commission will ex-
plore ways of enhancing the focus on Un 
performance to better achieve objectives, 
using existing possibilities offered under 
the financial regulation.European court of auditors
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commission aid implEmEntEd throUgh UnitEd nations 
organisations amoUnts to oVEr 1 Billion EUro pEr YEar. 
in this rEport thE coUrt EXaminEs WhEthEr dEcisions to 
channEl aid throUgh thE UnitEd nations arE thE rEsUlt 
of a transparEnt and oBJEctiVE sElEction procEss. it also 
EXaminEs WhEthEr monitoring and aUdit arrangEmEnts 
proVidE adEQUatE information on thE roBUstnEss of 
financial procEdUrEs and on WhEthEr fUnds haVE BEEn 
UsEd for thEir intEndEd pUrposE.
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